Central and Eastern Europe are turning to Taiwan as relations with China cool

Ruta chocolate may be little known outside of Lithuania. But everyone is talking about it in Taiwan.

Since the Baltic state announced in March that it would open a representative office in Taipei – one level below the official diplomatic mission but an indicator of deepening ties – Taiwanese credit card holders have had Lithuanian products valued at NT $ 2.5 billion US $). The tiny country has become the seventh largest market for Taiwan’s online shoppers.

The infatuation with Lithuanian cuisine is just a sign of a newfound love between Taiwan and the Central and Eastern European countries. The Baltic State, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have all donated Covid-19 vaccines to Taipei in recent months – the only EU member states to do so. In October, Taiwan’s chief economic planner will also lead a 65-strong investment delegation in three of the four countries.

The warming relationship comes as governments rethink their ties with China after hopes for economic gain from working together give way to fears of domination by an authoritarian superpower.

“Because China set up the 17 + 1, expectations were very high,” said Justyna Szczudlik, China analyst at the Polish think tank Institute for International Affairs, referring to a group that Beijing is responsible for dealing with Central and Eastern European Countries. “But gradually we noticed that this partnership was not bearing fruit and that China’s reach was mainly PR.”

A study of European views on China published last year by Palacký University in Olomouc and the Central European Institute of Asian Studies think tank found that Serbia and Latvia were the only Central and Eastern European countries with predominantly positive views. In the most hostile country in the Czech Republic, 56 percent of respondents had negative attitudes towards Beijing and 41 percent said their views had deteriorated over the past three years.

Disillusionment with economic opportunities is one reason. Poland sought closer relations with China in 2008 and hoped for an economic upswing after the global financial crisis. Warsaw also feared that it was too dependent on European markets and faced with diminishing EU funds. But enthusiasm waned when it became clear that Beijing wanted to use its economic clout to gain influence and that there were few economic gains.

A number of events have given cause for concern, according to Szczudlik. These include: Beijing’s “Made in China 2025†plan to make the country self-sufficient in core industries such as the semiconductor industry; the hostile takeover of the German robotics company Kuka by Chinese investors in 2016; and the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing’s infrastructure program that has heavily indebted partner countries. “We saw that they want access to critical infrastructure and that they seek control over investment projects,” she said.

In the political arena, concerns are even stronger. For many Central and Eastern European countries, the liberation from Soviet occupation or domination in 1989 is an integral part of their identity. The older generation views China with caution because Beijing has launched a bloody crackdown on the Tiananmen Square protests at the same time as it fled foreign rule.

For the same reason, the region is watching China’s growing ties with Russia with concern. The joint naval exercise between the two countries in the Baltic Sea in 2017 was “like a shock for Poland,” said Szczudlik.

Lithuania withdrew from the 17 + 1 group in May. The country’s president, Gitanas Nauseda, recently told the Financial Times Vilnius wants relations with China “on the basis of mutual respect” and insisted that it is “free” to choose who to cooperate with. “This shouldn’t add any additional tension,” he added.

It has also become a matter of course for the Baltic states to support young and small democracies after Iceland became the first country to recognize its independence from the Soviet Union in 1990.

“We had the great support of a small country that is very far from Lithuania. Iceland recognized our independence and showed the world that values ​​and principles still mean a lot in this time, â€said Nauseda.

Lithuania has hardened its stance on China the most vocal. Following its decision to set up joint representations with Taiwan, the country is now in a full-blown dispute with China, with Vilnius and Beijing dismissing their ambassadors.

The Lithuanian parliament has also passed resolutions critical of China, including one condemning Beijing’s policy in Xinjiang, where millions of ethnic Uyghurs were allegedly rounded up in mass detention camps, and another calling for a ban on Chinese tech giant Huawei.

Estonia and Latvia have made it clear that they would prefer the EU to take the lead in relations with China. “We need to think about the decades ahead and think about how we can reconcile these assertive ambitions as China wants to become a superpower,” said Marko Mihkelson, chairman of the Estonian parliament’s foreign affairs committee, this month. He added that the now 16 + 1 format had not worked well and more “joint action” by the EU would be better.

However, experts believe that the group is unlikely to break up quickly.

Martin Hala, founder and director of Sinopsis, an online platform for China analysis supported by Charles University in Prague, said it was “easier to join in 2012 than to leave now”.

“The lesson from Beijing’s sable rattle against Lithuania will be that countries are trying to go collectively, not individually,” he added. “But that can be difficult to coordinate.”